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ABSTRACT: Modern Greece has held a marginal existence in the 
study of nationalism, and yet there is a wealth of information that it 
provides which can broaden our understanding of nationalism and 
state-building, especially in the Balkans. The purpose of this article 
is to examine the various facets of Greek identity during the 
outbreak of the independence movement, and how that identity 
shaped and affected the movement itself. This article argues that 
socioeconomics paired with Greek regional identities hindered the 
creation of a strongly defined national identity. Furthermore, this 
lack of national identity led to several years of civil war during the 
independence movement and to the political strife that 
characterised the newly formed state. This article examines the 
complexities of the Greek War of Independence and the weak 
sense of Greek national identity through a distinctive examination 
of socioeconomic identity within the Greek-speaking lands. 
 
In the winter of 1832, nearly twelve years after fighting 
began, the members of the independent Greek state welcomed their 
new ruler. As the Bavarian-born King Otto arrived in the Bay of 
Nafplion, many Greeks “in their varied and picturesque dresses, 
hailed the young monarch as the deliverer from a state of society as 
intolerable as Turkish tyranny...The uniforms of many armies and 
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navies, and the sound of many languages, testified that most 
civilised nations had sent deputies to inaugurate the festival of the 
regeneration of Greece.”1 Otto had inherited a new state that, after 
several years of discord, was established by the Great Powers 
without any input from a Greek delegation. It was a state where a 
host of separatist identities gave birth to a hotbed of factionalism 
and disunity, which were further magnified during the Greek 
movement for independence. 
The Greek aspiration for independence was part and parcel 
of European ideas of freedom associated with the establishment of 
sovereign nation-states during the Age of Revolution. During this 
time, Enlightenment ideologies that pushed for more liberal 
societies led to the formation of new states throughout Europe, and 
this revolutionary fervor touched the people of the Greek world as 
they developed a strong desire for revolution and independence 
from Ottoman rule.2 In the spring of 1821, a revolt broke out in the 
Peloponnesus, marking the start of the Greek War of 
Independence. The war against the Ottoman Empire, which would 
last for nearly a decade, was characterized on the Greek side by ill-
preparedness, heavy fragmentation, civil war, and geopolitical 
maneuverings. It did ultimately result in the establishment of the 
Greek state, but this state was one established by the Great Powers, 
void of Greek representation, and with boundaries far smaller than 
had been hoped for by the Greek people. 
In the study of the Greek independence movement, it is 
important to remember that although Greece has had a place in 
written history for over two millennia, its formal identity as a 
nation is less than two centuries old. Greece has always been at the 
“crossroads” of cultural exchange and this in turn has created a 
large mosaic of identity, interlocking various groups into a 
                                                 
1 George Finlay, History of The Greek Revolution, vol. 2 (London: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), 291. 
2 John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, introduction to Nationalism, 
eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 7; Anthony Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 
1991), 35. 
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culturally Greek realm.3 Dating from the establishment and 
expansion of the Byzantine Empire, the Orthodox Church and the 
Greek language functioned as the two primary factors that bound 
south-eastern Europe together, creating an “expansive multi-ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic domain,” which in turn led to a loosely 
defined Greek identity.4 This Greek identity was allowed to 
continue under Ottoman rule due to Istanbul’s millet system, which 
was a policy that allowed religious and cultural freedom at the 
price of a heavy tax burden. However, it is because of this 
elasticity in Greek identity—many Greek speakers identified more 
closely with their regions and specific locales—as well as the 
socioeconomic conditions under the Ottoman Empire that we see 
such regional diversity in the Greek world emerge during the 400 
year period of Ottoman influence (a period also known as the 
Tourkokratia). 
The scholarly literature on nations and nationalism is vast. 
However, in the discussion of Greek identity and the formation of 
the state, vital questions can be posed through the seminal work of 
Benedict Anderson and his idea of the nation as an “imagined 
community.” Anderson analyzes the nation not only as an 
“imagined political community,” but also one that is 
simultaneously “limited and sovereign.”As he explains, the nation 
is imagined “because most of the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, 
or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their community.”5 Typically members of these communities, with 
the help of print capitalism to disseminate ideas, come together 
under the basis of several factors: language, religion, culture, 
history, and political ideologies. Nationalism, as posited by Ernest 
Gellner, is the process that “invents” nations through narrating 
                                                 
3 B. Dobratz and Y. Kourvetaris, A Profile of Modern Greece in Search 
on Identity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 1.  
4 Robert S. Peckham, Natural Histories, Natural States: Nationalism 
and the Politics of Place in Greece (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 2-3. 
5 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1983), 6.  
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national “histories” and “high culture.”6 This terminology as 
defined by Anderson and Gellner leads to questions about the 
Greek struggle for freedom from the Ottomans. 
Given that the Greek independence movement was 
spearheaded by an educated and wealthy diaspora, how would a 
local population that is unlettered envision a Greek state that was 
similar to the one imagined by the diaspora? In other words, whose 
imagined community was it? Also, with an agrarian population 
loyal to local notables and characterised by regional identities, how 
would the new national Greek identity and boundaries of the state 
be defined? Although many revolutions and independence 
movements have corollaries of factionalism, as well as foreign 
influence and involvement, what can be seen in the Greek struggle 
for independence is a strong disconnect of unity amongst the Greek 
people that plagued the movement from its conception and became 
magnified throughout the war itself. It is through a thorough 
examination of the independence movement that the lack of a prior 
strong national identity can be observed. 
Outside of Greece, the topic of Greek nationalism has held 
a marginal existence in the collective study of nationalism; 
however, it is precisely through understanding how nationalism 
played a role in nineteenth-century Balkan history that one can 
better contextualise identity and state-building in the declining 
Ottoman Empire. By closely examining the factionalism in the 
Greek War of Independence, one can gain historical insight into 
nationalist movements that emerge under empires, as well as parse 
the crucial role of diversity in identity and how it can and did 
affect them. It is also important to note when studying Greek 
nationalism during the revolution that, although it has been called 
the Greek Revolution or War of Independence in European 
scholarship, it is referred to by Turkish historians as the Greek 
Rebellion, which indicates that there are always multiple 
perspectives in the study of nationalist movements. By stepping 
away from the study of the Orthodox Church and geopolitics, both 
                                                 
6 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfield and 
Nicholson), 3. 
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of which have dominated the scholarship on the topic, one can also 
bring to light the aspect of social and regional identities during the 
movement. 
Anglophone scholarship about the Greek War of 
Independence is minimal. The works produced on the topic over 
the past few decades have nearly all addressed the conflict through 
the paradigm of the so-called Eastern Question.7 More recent 
works, such as Prousis’s Russian Society and the Greek Revolution 
and Pizanias’s The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event, 
continue the trend of examining the independence movement 
through the lens of the European Powers.8 While these works do 
contribute to our understanding of the Greek War of Independence, 
they fail to investigate the war from a primarily Greek perspective 
and attribute the war itself, and internal issues, to geopolitics or a 
Greek desire to model itself after the Great Powers. Other works 
have tended to romanticize the movement through the figure of 
Lord Byron, creating an overwhelming British philhellenic 
interpretation.9 
Many Greek historians who have written about the Greek 
War of Independence usually gloss over factionalism in order to 
posit that the Greeks came together in unity to free themselves 
from Ottoman oppression. These arguments are typically built 
                                                 
7 The Eastern Question was originally a nineteenth-century diplomatic 
term that referred to the competition between major European powers, such as 
Great Britain and Russia, to influence and control the perceived decline of the 
Ottoman Empire. For a detailed study of this subject, please see: Lucien J. Fray 
and Mara Kozelsky, eds., Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question 
Reconsidered (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).    
8 Prousis examines the Greek independence movement through the 
response of the Russian Empire due to the need to protect others of the Orthodox 
faith and against a regional enemy, the Ottoman Empire, in Theophilus C. 
Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1994); Pizanias examines the Greek Revolution as a 
European event in which the Great Powers became involved in order to gain 
influence in the Balkans, in Petros Pizanias, The Greek Revolution: A European 
Event (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011). 
9 For a recent interpretation of British Philhellenism, see: Roderick 
Beaton, Byron’s War: Romantic Rebellion, Greek Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
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upon the work of the prominent Greek historian, Douglas Dankin, 
who suggested that, although the independence movement had its 
pockets of “lawlessness and factionalism,” the Greek people were 
nonetheless brought together by a “sense of nationhood” in which 
regional groups supported centralized government.10 However, 
through the use of memoirs, travelogues, government documents, 
and secondary literature, and by examining the various social 
groups and regional identities within the Greek world, this article 
suggests that rather than a “sense of nationhood,” it was the 
common goal of freedom from the Ottoman yoke among the 
peasants of mainland Greece that produced any sense of 
unification that did emerge. Moreover, it was precisely because 
various regional groups did not support centralized government, 
but rather regional governments, that civil war erupted during the 
independence movement. What becomes apparent is that even 
though there was a sense of nationalism in the Greek struggle for 
independence, the social and regional identities that were present 
within the Greek world, and the educated diaspora’s particular 
vision of a Greek state, deeply affected the movement. It was 
because of the inability of the Greek people to create a cohesive 
national identity that the Greek War of Independence assumed a 
specific character of being dominated by factionalism and civil 
war. 
This article will begin by introducing the regions and main 
socioeconomic groups within the Greek world prior to and during 
the independence movement, as well as showing how each group 
was viewed and characterized by others. After the introduction of 
these main groups, this work will briefly assess the Greek War of 
Independence, the formation of provisional governments, and the 
civil wars that occurred during the movement to show how deeply 
socioeconomic and regional groups clashed with one another, 
                                                 
10 Douglas Dakin, “The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-1833,” in 
The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of 
the Greek War of Independence, ed. Richard Clogg (Hamden, Connecticut: 
Archon Books, 1972), 159-177.  
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creating disunity and hindering the formation of a national Greek 
identity. 
 
Regional and Social Identity 
 
The Greek world, which was able to culturally survive 
under Ottoman rule, was vast and encompassed most of south-
eastern Europe. In terms of Greek identity, the lines were blurred 
due to the fact that Greek had remained the lingua franca of the 
Balkans because of the Orthodox Church. However, when it came 
to the actual Greek War of Independence, the revolutionary 
fighting stayed within Greece proper. For purposes of 
nomenclature, Greece proper refers roughly to the borders of the 
modern-day country. It is divided into three regions: Morea 
(modern-day Peloponnesus), Rumeli (present-day northern Greece 
and into Macedonia and Bulgaria), and the Aegean islands. 
Historically, Rumeli was further partitioned into east and west. In 
the context of this essay, the term diaspora refers to any Greeks 
living outside of Greece proper. Furthermore, the people of the 
rural areas within these regions typically conceived of themselves 
as provincial units in which the concept of a Patrida (fatherland) 
and loyalty was confined to locales as they formed “a kind of 
republic.”11 The existence of local “republics” also shows that the 
concept of Greece and the definition of Greek identity were up for 
grabs by various regional groups during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. 
To understand how identity played a role in the movement, 
it is crucial to examine the socioeconomic groups that developed 
within the Greek sphere during the Tourkokratia. The three main 
groups were the: Phanariots, merchants, and peasants. The 
Phanariots were Greeks who were able to procure wealth by 
obtaining local government positions from the central Ottoman 
government, known as the “Porte,” in Istanbul. Given the semi-
                                                 
11 Benjamin Brue, Journal de la campagne que la Grand vesir Ali 
Pacha á faite en 1715 pour la Conquête de la Moreé (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 
1870), 38. 
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autonomous rule allowed throughout Greece and the Danubian 
principalities, the Ottoman Empire relied on these Phanariots to 
govern western regions and to collect heavy taxes, while the 
Phanariots themselves enjoyed “special tax privileges.”12 As the 
empire slowly declined, the Ottomans found it necessary to rely on 
the Phanariots to enact governmental control in Eastern Europe 
and in their dealings with the Christian West.13 The seats of power 
obtained by Phanariots became synonymous with family and 
corruption as the positions would pass from father to son, keeping 
it within a patrilineal framework. 
While the Phanariots came to enjoy their power and 
influence within the empire, they slowly separated themselves 
from the rest of the Greek people, exuding an almost Ottoman 
identity. Unlike some of the other Greek social groups during this 
time, which had gained wealth and affluence through commerce 
and other means of their own production, the Phanariots used the 
Turkish government to build pecuniary power and to bolster their 
self-interests. Some of their contemporaries believed that 
prominent Phanariots swindled the Ottoman government for 
personal gain by syphoning off the taxes they collected and by 
misadvising Turkish authorities in order to suit their own interests. 
Further, these actions were continuously executed not with the 
accession of other Greeks, but because they were a “body united in 
their own interests.”14 
The governmental authority and power bestowed upon the 
Phanariots by the Ottomans created a group of Greeks who wished 
to maintain and expand their power—in doing so, they often 
embraced Ottoman customs and fashioned themselves after them. 
During his travels through the Eastern Mediterranean, American 
army officer William Eaton noted that “the most observable 
                                                 
12 Richard Clogg, introduction to The Struggle for Greek Independence: 
Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, ed. 
Richard Clogg (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972), 2.  
13 Clogg,, introduction,  9-10. 
14 Photios Khrysanthopoulos and Satvros Andropoulos, 
Apomnimonovemata peri tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos 1821-1828, vol. 1 (Athens: 
Epikairoteta, 1899), 32-33. 
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difference in the Grecian character is between those of 
Constantinople and their countrymen of the islands…but there is a 
race of Greeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise 
those of the islands.” He continued by asserting that Phanariots 
cared nothing more than to preserve the “opulence” that was 
afforded to them as they fashioned themselves after the Ottomans 
and maintained power over their fellow Greeks. They were also 
“the only part of the nation [Greece] who have totally relinquished 
the ancient Greek spirit; they seem not anxious as the islanders are 
for liberty, but delight in false magnificence.”15 Various 
Phanariots would play an integral role in the struggle for 
independence by inciting revolution, through their involvement in 
provisional government, and by heading factions of revolutionary 
militia.  However, it is easy to see with such disparities between 
the wealthy Phanariots and their poor peasant brethren—who 
would constitute most of the military forces—some of the fault 
lines that became apparent during the fight for a Greek state. The 
Phanriots’ desire to blend themselves within the Ottoman system 
and their eagerness to maintain their power would only create 
disdain among the people of Greece proper. 
Like the Phanariots, Greek merchants slowly accumulated 
wealth and produced powerful families, essentially creating a 
Greek bourgeois class. However, merchant families amassed their 
fortunes through their own endeavours, frequently by exploiting 
the laxity in Ottoman trade laws.16 Many of these wealthy families 
left Greece proper during the Tourkokratia and constituted the 
Greek diaspora of Western Europe and the Russian Empire. As the 
British physician and writer Henry Holland suggested: “The active 
spirit of the Greeks, deprived in great measure of political or 
national objectives, has taken a general direction towards 
commerce.”17  The Ottoman leniency in regulating how these 
                                                 
15 William Eaton, A Survey of the Turkish Empire (London: T Caldwell 
and W. Davies, 1809), 331. Emphasis added.  
16 Clogg, introduction, 12.  
17 Henry Holland, Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, 
Macedonia & c. during the years 1812 and 1813 (London: Longman, Hurst, 
Rees, Orme and Brown, Paternoster-Row, 1819), 148. 
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Greeks developed commercial strength within the empire allowed 
them to expand their enterprise beyond their homes and into 
neighbouring areas.  Holland also noted how these families gained 
power by emigrating into “adjacent countries,” and he gives an 
example of the dispersal of four brothers from a single family: 
“one was settled in Ioannina, another at Moscow, a third at 
Constantinople, and the fourth in some part of Germany; all 
connected together in their concerns.”18 
It was outside of the Ottoman Empire that many of these 
merchants set up Greek communities and began to build up their 
wealth. Because of these communities throughout Russia and the 
West, many families of the diaspora were able to hold on to their 
Greek identity while adopting Western culture and attending the 
universities of Europe. This in turn created a wealthy and educated 
group far removed from Greece proper and the conditions within 
the Ottoman Empire. While Phanariot families were almost 
explicitly viewed with popular disdain, wealthy merchant families 
were seen in a mixed light: they sometimes received praise but at 
other times had their moral character called into question because 
of the way they accumulated wealth.19 Just like the Phanariots, the 
merchants became a distinct wealthy group within the Greek 
world, but they were mainly outside of Greece proper and led lives 
that were far different than those of their fellow Greeks in the 
Peloponnesus where the revolution was centred. Just like the 
ideologies they encountered through education, the merchants 
desired a Greek nation with a liberal government modeled after the 
emerging governments in the West. Much of this can be seen at the 
beginning of the push for independence, as the primary visionaries 
of the movement were from merchant families. 
While some members of the diaspora were able to further 
develop wealth and power outside of the Ottoman Empire, the 
people of Greece proper were subjected to a power struggle 
between the Venetians and Ottomans until the area finally came 
                                                 
18 Holland, Travels in the Ionian Isles, 149.  
19 Samuel G. Howe, An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution (New 
York: White, Gallaher & White, 1828), 18. 
Madison Historical Review 61 
 
under full Ottoman control in the late eighteenth century. The 
population of Greece proper consisted mainly of peasants, who 
were confined to subsistence farming and working the land of local 
wealthy notables. The few Greeks who did own land during this 
period used obligations of allegiance and force to make others cede 
land ownership, as they would incorporate these new holdings into 
their own domain and create substantial local power for 
themselves.20 
To understand the differences of social identity especially 
that of the peasants, one needs to understand how Greek society 
functioned. In a sociological study on modern Greek society, 
Richard and Eva Blum used comparative analysis and concluded 
that nineteenth-century, rural Greek society had remained, for the 
most part, unchanged since the time of Homer; that is, society in 
Greece proper had managed to remain agrarian, poorly educated, 
and centered on loyalty to local leadership and towns.21 This 
continuation in the function of peasant society was not the same 
for wealthy merchants and the diaspora, who became educated 
elites within a broader European society.  Regardless of these 
social differences within Greek society, one would suspect that a 
common vision of a free Greek nation-state would emerge, 
especially through the dissemination of liberal ideologies by the 
diaspora; however, this was not the case. The peasants did not 
“espouse” the same ideologies or vision of the diaspora.22 In fact, 
the general consensus within the Greek world was that one of the 
main groups that hindered Greek freedom was the merchants of the 
diaspora, who were more concerned with life outside of Greece 
                                                 
20 Dionysios Zakythenos, The Making of Modern Greece: From 
Byzantium to Independence, trans. K. Johnstone (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1976), 24. 
21 Richard Blum and Eva Blum, Health and Healing in Rural Greece, a 
Study of Three Communities (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1965). 
22 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 29; Thomas Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the 
Greeks, 1768-1913 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 74.  
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proper than the realities faced by the peasants.23 With the peasants 
abhorring their wealthy brethren, stark fissures became visible 
within Greek society. 
As the diaspora amassed wealth, the peasants within the 
Greek world endured deplorable conditions. The disparities 
between the peasants, regional notables, and the diaspora were 
described by the French statesman Felix Beaujour when he noted: 
“the peasants die of hunger while their landlords abound with 
gold.”24 It was due to this exploitation and the constant threat from 
Ottoman forces that many peasants fled into the hills and took up 
brigandage. These bandits were known as klephts. They became a 
thorn in the side of the Ottoman Empire, while they gained a Robin 
Hood-like image with local peasants, which can be seen in folk 
ballads such as “Christos Milionis” and “Olympos and 
Kissabos.”25 Small bands of klephts would come down from the 
hills and engage Ottoman troops in skirmishes, stealing and 
pillaging in the process.  As a countermeasure to the klephts, the 
Ottomans created regional groups of armed forces to combat the 
brigands; these hired bands of militia were called armatoloi. Many 
men from both groups would often defect back and forth between 
the two. One of the most famous generals of the war, Theodore 
Kolokotronis, was once a klepht, then became an armatalos, and 
then finally a klepht again. Howe wrote: “The klephts, or robbers, 
were, as the Greeks styled them, wild armatoloi—that is, Greeks 
who live by arms, but unlicensed by the Turks and in hostility to 
them.” He also noted that military bands developed “under the 
direction of different Greek chiefs.”26 
The peasants generally lacked the education that would 
have enabled them to envision a Greek nation governed by the 
                                                 
23 Anonymous, “Elliniki Nomarchia,” in The Movement for Greek 
Independence, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1976), 106-117. 
24 Felix Beaujour, A View of the Commerce of Greece: Formed after an 
Average, from 1787 to 1797 (London: H.L. Calabin, 1800), 88.  
25 John S. Blackie, Horae Hellenicae: Essays and Discussions on Some 
Important Points of Greek Philology and Antiquity (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1874), 308. 
26 Howe, An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, 21-22. 
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people and founded upon specific Enlightenment principles. 
However, they could not have failed to desire freedom from 
economic exploitation and from the poor conditions that 
accompanied their subjugation. Acknowledging these sentiments, 
an American traveling through the Aegean wrote that the peasants 
lived in “wretched Greek houses, in which there is neither chair, 
table, nor bed, and where the miserable mothers often shut the door 
in your face, looking at you as a new oppressor, come to plunder 
them of their little substance.”27 The peasants, whose agrarian 
lifestyle was essentially controlled by notables, became united 
regional bodies under the influence of local powerful families. 
Further, distinct characterizations were drawn amongst the various 
people when it came to the regions in which they lived. In regards 
to this regionalism, Thomas Gordon posited that: “Amongst 
themselves certain shades of distinction are drawn; the Rumeliotes 
being reckoned brave and hardy, the Moreotes timid and shy, and 
the islanders of the Archipelago…acute and dexterous, but inclined 
to indolence and frivolity.”28 It is the peasants who were the 
bulkhead of the Greek forces during the revolution, fighting under 
regional banners for freedom from the Ottoman Empire. The stark 
differences in characterizations suggest more systematic lines of 
difference, again suggesting how factionalism could become 
commonplace, even from the conception of the independence 
movement. 
 
The Push for Independence 
 
The two key pre-revolutionary figures, both of whom are 
given credit as fathers of the revolution despite their different 
visions of the movement, are Adamantios Koraïs and Rigas 
Feraios. Both men were born into affluent families within the 
Ottoman Empire but were educated in Western Europe, where they 
                                                 
27 Anonymous, “Visit to Joannina and Ali Pasha,” The North-American 
Review and Miscellaneous Journal 10 (1820): 432. 
28 Thomas Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, and the Wars and 
Campaigns Arising from the Struggles of the Greek Patriots Emancipating Their 
Country from the Turkish Yolk, vol. 1 (London: T. Cavall, 1844), lv. 
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spent their adult lives creating revolutionary inspired works. By 
secretly publishing works in Greek, the two men were able to reach 
a broader audience and create revolutionary fervor within Greece 
proper. By examining their pro-revolutionary ideologies, it 
becomes apparent that both men were well aware of the conditions 
within Greece, but had rather distinct approaches as to how a 
revolution should be carried out. 
Rigas Feraios was born into a wealthy family in Thessaly, 
where he became well-educated before moving to Istanbul and 
then later to Vienna. While in Vienna, Feraios was influenced by 
contemporary events in revolutionary France, which inspired him 
to envision a free Greece modeled after the new French Republic. 
Feraios published a Greek-language newspaper from Vienna, 
Ephemeris, in the hopes of reaching the broader Greek-speaking 
population. The heavy influence of the French Revolution can be 
seen in the pro-revolutionary works of Feraios such as his own 
version of The Declaration of The Rights of Man and The New 
Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the 
Islands of the Aegean, and the principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, published in 1797.29 
Feraios called for an immediate revolt against the Ottoman 
Empire and encouraged the unification of the Balkans to form a 
Pan-Hellenic nation—in a sense a Byzantine revival uniting all 
Greek-speaking peoples sharing a Greek culture within the region. 
With no regard to possible “future ethnic divisions,” Feraios 
believed that the Orthodox Church should play a minor role in the 
new nation and the official language should be Greek.30 This 
vision of a Pan-Hellenic nation was exemplified by his 1797 battle 
cry, “Thourios,” in which Feraios called for all people of the 
Balkans to rise up against the Ottoman Empire and free themselves 
                                                 
29 Rigas Feraios, “The Declaration of the Rights of Man,” (1797) in The 
Movement for Greek Indpendence, ed. Richard Clogg, 150-157; Rigas Feraios, 
“The New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the 
Islands of the Aegean, and the Principalities of Moldovia and Wallachia” (1797) 
in The Movement for Greek Independence, ed. Richard Clogg, 157-163. 
30 Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short Story (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2002), 72. 
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from “slavery.”31 With the French Revolution transitioning into the 
Reign of Terror, Austrian officials did not take kindly to such 
revolutionary activity and Feraios was eventually captured, 
murdered, and dumped into the Sava River in 1798. Reportedly 
Feraios’ dying words were: “This is how brave men die.  I have 
sown; the time will soon come when my country will gather the 
harvest.”32 For Feraios, the vision of a Greek nation was far 
different from that of his contemporary, Koraïs. 
Feraios’s interlocutor Adamantios Koraïs was born into a 
prominent family in Smyrna.  He had a passion for education and 
made money by translating ancient Greek texts into modern 
languages. Unlike Feraios, Koraïs did not have a desire to see a 
unified Balkan Empire, but rather wanted freedom for the people 
of Greece proper. In particular, he despised the Turks and the 
thought of “living together with Turks” made him feel as though 
he could fall “into genuine madness.”33 In 1788, Koraïs moved to 
Paris where he was later heavily influenced by the French 
Revolution. Koraïs recognized that the way to institute 
Enlightenment ideologies was through education.  
To Koraïs, the masses of Greece proper were ill-prepared 
for a revolution, and he firmly believed that education and national 
identity needed to be refined within the Greek world.  Koraïs 
posited that the “spread of education in the French nation gave 
birth to the love of liberty,” and he believed it was the duty of the 
wealthy Greeks to “educate our people.”34 In an attempt to begin 
the process of education, Koraïs undertook the task of “purifying” 
the Greek language. In his new Greek language, Katharevousa, he 
sought to reform demotic Greek into a more pure language that 
closely resembled ancient Greek. However, Katharevousa never 
became widely used and was confined mainly to official 
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documents. Even when the revolution erupted in 1821, Koraïs 
stood by his sentiments that the Greeks were still too 
undereducated and unprepared to succeed. The Greeks “have not 
yet enough learning to understand their true interest,” he noted, 
stating that “the right time would have been 1850.”35 As shown by 
these two pre-revolutionary figures, even before the birth of the 
revolution there was already disagreement on how and when it 
should begin, as well as problems defining a “motherland” and 
what its boundaries should be. This problem of defining the Greek 
sate would also be seen in the secret society founded to bring the 
revolution into existence. 
In 1814, three merchants founded the Philiki Etairia 
(Society of Friends) in Odessa. The purpose of the society was to 
build membership and procure the influence and money needed to 
unite all Greeks to start a revolution to liberate the motherland.36 
The society was slow to start but grew to a considerable size within 
five years. The Philiki Etairia was comprised primarily of wealthy 
merchants of the diaspora with little representation from Greece 
proper other than a few regional notables from Rumeli, the islands, 
and the Peloponnesus, where the revolution would take place.37 As 
the society grew in size, its first task was to find a prominent 
person to be a revolutionary figurehead, preferably one who could 
garner support from a major European power. The first person who 
was offered the position was the then-Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Greek Ioannis Kapodistrias. He promptly declined and 
warned the men that Greece was not yet ready for revolution, and 
that Russia would play no part in backing it. “You must be out of 
your senses, Sir, to dream of such a project,” Kapodistrias told the 
Etairia member who approached him, “The only advice I can give 
you is to tell nobody…they must abandon their revolutionary 
course and live as before.”38 Kapodistrias’ rejection meant the 
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society would have to find another influential individual who had 
ties to a Great Power. 
The next person the society approached was the young 
Alexander Ypsilantis, who was from a prominent Phanariot family 
and gained recognition through his service in the Russian military. 
The eager Ypsilantis quickly accepted the position as leader with 
the promise of Russian support, which caused money to flood into 
the society. With a new prominent leader and its coffers full, the 
Philiki Etairia soon began planning an outbreak of revolution. 
There were initial plans to have dual points of outbreak, one in the 
Danubian principalities (Romania) and one in the Peloponnesus. 
However, only the Danubian Revolt came to fruition with 
Ypsilantis leading a small army under the call to “fight for faith 
and Motherland.”39  
With no materialization of Russian support, which had 
been promised by Ypsilantis, the Danubian Revolt quickly became 
a disaster, ending with heavy losses and Ypsilantis’s imprisonment 
in Austria.  The Danubian Revolt suggests that the Greece that was 
envisioned by the Philiki Etairia—composed mainly of the 
diaspora—was one with considerably large borders and 
reminiscent of the Byzantine Empire. One of the biggest problems 
for the organization was creating a sense of motherland for an 
agrarian society traditionally loyal to local notables and towns. As 
suggested by Misha Glenny, the conspirators had a poor grasp of 
the “idea of the geographical motherland, or who belonged in it.”40 
The society’s revolutionary influence had been strong, but its 
weaknesses in defining a motherland proved problematic. 
Ultimately, the revolt that led to the Greek War of Independence 
did begin within the Peloponnesus, but at the behest of its 
inhabitants, not the Philiki Etairia. 
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The Revolution and Civil War 
 
In March 1821, the people of the Peloponnesus went into 
open revolt against the Ottoman Empire, beginning the Greek War 
of Independence within Greece proper. With the early success of 
the revolt in the Peloponnesus, the people of the islands and 
Rumeli took up arms as well, fighting effectively throughout 
Greece proper and creating strongholds for revolutionary activity. 
The people of the various regions within Greece were 
simultaneously fighting for the control of numerous cities held by 
the Ottoman military, which were spread far throughout the whole 
of Greece proper. One of the first successes of the land war was 
also one of the first instances in which regional identities became 
apparent. 
From the onset of the revolution, the variations in Greek 
identity were visible. When forming an initial band of fighters and 
throughout the war, the famous Peloponnesian General Theodore 
Kolokotronis, repeatedly labelled his regular troops as “Maniotes,” 
distinguishing them from other Greeks by indicating they were 
from the Mani region, and attesting to their fearlessness and fierce 
fighting abilities.41 This tendency to label other Greeks shows how 
Greeks characterized and identified one another by their specific 
region. At the outbreak of the revolution, a band of Peloponnesian 
troops blockaded the island citadel of Monemvasia. The Greek 
forces cut off supply lines to the Ottoman troops in the citadel, 
starting a siege that would last several months. When the Ottomans 
were ready to discuss terms of surrender, they refused to speak 
with the besiegers; instead, they held negotiations with a diaspora 
representative, Dimitirios Ypsilantis—the brother of the 
imprisoned Alexander. When they learned of the negotiations, 
those who were responsible for the siege were angered and said 
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that they, “the Peloponnesians…had used their resources and spilt 
their blood,” therefore, “the surrender should be to the Greek 
people, to Ellinikon ethnos.”42 From the response of the 
Peloponnesians, it is apparent that there was a sense of disconnect 
between the people of Greece proper and the diaspora. The term 
Ellinikon ethnos (Greek people) suggests that the Peloponnesians 
saw themselves as the true representatives of a Greek state, not the 
member of the diaspora, or any Greeks outside of the 
Peloponnesus for that matter. 
In July 1821, as the Greek advances became more 
numerous, Dimitrios Ypsilantis arrived in Greece proper to assert 
leadership over ground forces and give the diaspora representative 
leadership. His arrival immediately caused a schism within the 
movement and this division continued to grow as the war raged on. 
When Ypsilantis entered Greece proper, he had support from 
powerful members of the diaspora. However, the military leaders 
put all their support behind the Peloponnesian General 
Kolokotronis, and a third faction emerged that supported other 
Peloponnesian notables. When Ypsilantis suggested that a 
government be established with him as leader, regional notables 
objected and discord soon ensued, with troops plotting the demise 
of various notables. Worried that word of the rising internal 
tensions would reach the European powers from whom the Greeks 
hoped to gain support, Kolokotronis stated: “If we kill our own 
primates, what will the kings say?”43 With his influence, 
Kolokotronis was able to temporarily quell the agitated troops, but 
the factions grew further apart when the Greeks began the task of 
forming a new government. 
Six months after the revolution began, regional Greek 
representatives began to form their own various governments. In 
the Peloponnesus, primates came together to form a senate, which 
produced a political entity that sought to continue the war as its 
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members saw fit.44 North of the Peloponnesus, two other regional 
governments emerged. In eastern Rumeli a government was 
formed with a prominent Phanariot, Alexander Mavrokordatos, as 
its leader, whereas in western Rumeli, a separate government was 
formed under the Phanariot Theodore Negris. The development of 
these government bodies led to further factionalism, and to make 
matter worse, the regional groups viewed each other with 
particular disdain. As historian John Petropoulos has suggested, the 
Rumeliots thought the Peloponnesians were “untrustworthy and 
effete,” while the Peloponnesians saw the Rumeliots as “backward 
and boorish,” while the people of the islands “displayed an insular 
contempt for all mainlanders.”45 The Greeks realized that to 
continue with the revolution, a single government needed to be 
formed, but with discord being brought to the surface by regional 
tensions, factionalism was about to boil over. 
A year into the war, regional representatives met in the 
Peloponnesian town of Epidaurus to draft a provisional 
constitution and form a centralized, representative government. 
The drafting council was heavily influenced by Negris and 
Mavrokordatos. This constitution was based on an American 
model, which called for three branches of government to form a 
system of checks and balances, and was meant to last only for a 
year until a new constitution was written.46 When it came time to 
decide the leadership of the branches, the influence of the 
Phanariots was apparent as Mavrokordatos became the head of the 
executive branch, and Negris and Kolettis (Negris a Phanariot and 
Kolettis a wealthy merchant from Epirus) filled the other two seats. 
Although the goal of the assembly was to create unity, the result 
was arguably the opposite; there was no dissolution of the regional 
governments, and no representation for the prominent military 
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leaders who had been so influential in the movement.47 In essence, 
the convention at Epidaurus failed to achieve its main goal, the 
formation of a strong centralized government. 
Immediately after the council, Mavrokordatos returned to 
his stronghold in Rumeli, where he planned to execute his new 
presidential powers. With Mavrokordatos away from the 
Peloponnesus, General Kolokotronis gained increased support and 
popularity through various military successes. This is turn led 
many to question if the leadership of the new government had been 
chosen incorrectly. What resulted from the growing dissatisfaction 
was essentially two government entities: one based in the 
Peloponnesus under the influence of Kolokotronis, and another in 
Rumeli still under the leadership of Mavrokordatos.48 As tensions 
widened the rupture in Greek politics, another council was called 
in April 1823 to draft a new constitution—albeit a year later than 
what was originally proposed at the first council. 
The representatives present were double that of the 
original, with more than half coming from the Peloponnesus. At 
the second council the atmosphere was frantic, and as Trikoupis 
described it, “disorderly and alarming.”49 The main goal of the 
second assembly was to write a constitution that strengthened 
central authority and to prove to Europe that Greece was capable 
of being a modern European nation.50 However, tension at the 
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council was such that two rival factions, along with their armed 
militias, ended up staying in different towns. One faction 
supported Mavrokordatos, while the other supported Kolokotronis. 
When General Kolokotronis threatened to end the council and take 
complete control of the military, the executive position was offered 
to him as a way to ease tension and garner popular support.51 
Kolokotronis accepted the offer, but factionalism remained strong 
and led to a power struggle between the former executive and now-
head of the senate, Mavrokordatos, and his successor 
Kolokotronis. 
Civil war soon ensued between two regional government 
bodies, one backed by the Peloponnesus and the other by Rumeli 
and the islands. For the next two years of the revolution, 
consecutive civil wars engulfed Greece, pitting the regions of 
Greece proper against one another.52 While a power struggle 
definitely played a part in the factionalism that developed within 
the movement, it is also important to understand how regional 
identity acted as a driving force behind the conflicts. As infighting 
plagued Greece proper, the leader of the Rumelian government, 
Mavrokordatos, stayed at his stronghold in Messolonghi. In a letter 
to Mavrokordatos, the statesman Spyridon Trikoupis suggested 
that the leader not join efforts to militarily supress Peloponnesian 
power, but rather stay in Messolonghi and “attend to the interests 
of his own region.”53  
What can be inferred from this correspondence is that, not 
only did Trikoupis acknowledge that power interests ran along 
regional lines rather than solely within small factions, but he also 
suggested that the civil war was characterised by regionalism. 
Additionally, the Peloponnesian leader Andreas Zaimis wrote to 
his regional counterpart, Andreas Londos, that the inhabitants of 
the islands (who were allied with Rumeli) sought “the elimination 
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of any Peloponnesians with substantial power and influence,” 
further suggesting regionalism as the basis for the ongoing power 
struggle. 54 
Another way in which we can understand how many 
Greeks saw themselves within the Greek world, is to look to the 
memoirs of the Rumelian commander, Yannis Makriyannis. Upon 
examination of Makriyannis’ writings it is apparent that, although 
all those involved considered themselves Greek, they specifically 
saw themselves as regional Greeks; that is, a Rumelian Greek, or a 
Morean Greek, etc. It was commonplace for Greek people to 
preface their Greek identity with regional or city monikers. This 
regional identification during the civil wars, as well as the power 
struggle between regional notables is apparent when Makriyannis 
wrote: “other Rumeliots and the Peloponnesians as well wish to 
keep you slaves and advance their own interests…and stir up one 
civil war after another.” Furthermore, Makriyannis referred to the 
members of the diaspora involved in the war as simply “those who 
come from over the border.”55 This rhetoric gives insight into how 
the Greeks of Greece proper viewed the diaspora.  It is this 
adherence to regionalism that proved to be a hindering factor in 
creating a strong national Greek identity during the war of 
independence. These regional identities and the civil wars during 
the independence movement are also reminiscent of the polis 
system of classical Greece and the Peloponnesian War; regional 
identities and alliances fuelled a power struggle between all 
Greeks. 
While the Greeks were occupied by three years of 
infighting, Egyptian forces entered the war to aid the Ottomans. In 
1825, the Egyptians began taking back many of the Ottoman losses 
in the Peloponnesus and stripped the Greeks of their most 
important strongholds. With heavy losses and the massacre of 
Greeks in numerous Peloponnesian villages, Greek aspirations for 
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freedom began to look ominous to those fighting against the 
Ottomans. Amidst these new developments, the Greeks 
temporarily put their differences aside and united once again. With 
the promise of foreign intervention, Greek forces began to push 
back the Ottoman advances. In 1827, after numerous appeals from 
the Greeks, Britain, France, and Russia finally intervened and the 
Greek War of Independence was won at the Battle of Navarino. It 
was at the Battle of Navarino that the famous British admiral 
Edward Codrington nearly lost a leg and was so badly injured that 
the Duke of Wellington relieved him of his duties, although the 
official reason given was Codrington’s failure to adhere to 
orders.56 
Because of the intervention of the Great Powers at 
Navarino, historians have debated whether or not foreign 
intervention came due to the emergence of notions of 
Philhellenism, or because of the desire of the European nations to 
curb Ottoman dominance in the region. What is less debated is 
whether or not the Greeks would have gained independence 
without the involvement of the Great Powers; scholars insist they 
most certainly would not have.57 After the defeat of the Ottomans, 
the people of Greece experienced a period of interim government 
before finally achieving statehood in 1830. Ironically, the person 
who filled the position of interim president was none other than the 
former Russian Foreign Minister and the man who declined the 
Philiki Etairia, Kapodistrias.  
Kapodistrias made it his task to unify the regional groups 
still present within Greece, but factionalism between these camps 
remained high and he was ultimately unsuccessful.58 In 1831, 
members of the Mavromichalis family—notables from the 
Peloponnesus—assassinated Kapodistrias, which prompted the 
Great Powers to hold the London Conference and establish the 
Greek state as a constitutional monarchy. It was during this 
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conference that the national borders and the new monarch were 
decided, but the conference was lacking Greek representation and 
the decisions were made without any Greek consultation.59 After 
the Treaty of Constantinople was signed and enacted in July 1832, 
the Greeks solidified their independence and an autonomous Greek 
nation was officially recognised by Europe. Greece was now a 
monarchical state under King Otto, a Bavarian prince, and the 
country’s borders consisted of the most southern portion of 
Rumeli, the Peloponnesus, and a handful of Aegean islands. The 
establishment of the new government by the Great Powers created 
even more factionalism amongst the Greeks as a royalist versus 
non-royalist divide emerged, and the development of political 
parties influenced by the British, French, and Russians added even 




The Greek War of Independence was successful in that the 
Greek people were able to gain independence from the Ottoman 
Empire, but it is less clear to what extent it succeeded in creating a 
unified Greek state and national identity. As many historians have 
agreed, the Greeks would have never succeeded with their 
revolution had the European powers not intervened. It is through 
this intervention that the Greek state was established in 1832, 
although the nation born was a very “truncated” version of what 
was hoped for at the onset of revolution.60 From the outbreak of 
the revolution, the Greek struggle was heavily marked by internal 
struggle that continually manifested itself in infighting and 
political tumult. Greece itself, though imagined as a cultural and 
political entity in the minds of people for over two thousand years, 
had never been a tangible nation-state. Even before the Age of 
Pericles and the Hellenistic era ushered in by the achievements of 
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Alexander the Great, the Greek realm and its influence had 
expanded and contracted over the centuries. 
Variation in identity and internal warfare can be traced 
back to ancient times and be seen in examples such as the Ionian-
Dorian divide and the Peloponnesian War. Once the people of the 
Byzantine Empire had fallen under Ottoman control, the semi-
autonomous governments that the Greeks were afforded during the 
Tourkokratia only helped to strengthen regional identities and 
develop stark differences in the socioeconomic groups of the 
Greek world. Although some historians may question the term 
regionalism, it is appropriate in the case of the Greek War of 
Independence. Even though it can be argued that regionalism 
would suggest that a Peloponnesian or Rumelian state would have 
been established, it is hard to say without asserting inevitability 
what the independence movement’s eventual outcome would have 
been without the aid of the Great Powers. However, given the 
pockets of regional governments and the lack of centralized 
authority, more than likely the various regions would have become 
their own governing entities. 
Although some Greeks were afforded wealth and power 
under Ottoman rule, specifically the Phanariots, there was a 
growing trend towards freedom amongst the Greeks as a whole. At 
the same time that Greek nationalism was on the rise, so too were 
the differences in Greek society. The formation of the Philiki 
Etairia and its subsequent undertakings can almost certainly be 
credited for the start of the Greek War of Independence, but the 
organization itself was founded by men who had built their wealth 
and had been educated outside of the Greek peninsula, living in 
situations much different than those found in Greece proper. 
Moreover, although the onset of revolution can be attributed to the 
Philiki Etairia, it produced vague goals, and was unable to 
properly define what constituted the motherland or help create 
cohesion in identity.61 It is because of this reason that after the 
failed Danubian Revolt and the Peloponnesians’ successful 
uprising without the diaspora, that the Philiki Etairia had little 
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representation once the war began. As suggested by Richard 
Clogg, the national ardor created by the Greek diaspora was not 
necessarily shared by the “unlettered” people of Greece proper, 
and this led to problems for the Greeks when it came to imagining 
what an autonomous Greek state would look like.62 
When the independence movement finally became a reality, 
the various wants and goals of the different Greek social groups 
were too divergent to create a symbiotic relationship amongst 
them. After the war against the Ottoman Empire began, the 
dissimilarities and the subsidiary aims of the different groups came 
to the forefront. The Greek elites wanted to maintain political 
power bereft of the Ottomans, the military leaders wanted to create 
their own centers of power, and the peasants wanted a chance at 
owning land and improving their living situations.63 Nowhere were 
these differences echoed more loudly than in Greece proper, due 
the fact that it was in a semi-autonomous state under Ottoman rule. 
This lack of an Ottoman presence allowed for the creation of 
regional identities and power vacuums under wealthy landowners 
that only turned into pronounced factionalism once the revolution 
started.64 
The factor of regional identity can be seen in the memoirs 
of the famous general Makriyannis, who acknowledged that the 
diaspora were different than other Greeks, repeatedly referred to 
himself as Rumelian, described others by their region—such as 
Peloponnesian—and only sporadically used the term Greek as a 
collective identifier.65 It was conventional for one to have 
allegiance to their specific locale and distinguish themselves as 
from that region or town before recognizing themselves as Greek. 
When it comes to identity, Greek historian Theodore Zervas has 
recently posited that the modern Greek national identity did not 
emerge until after the establishment of the state, and that it was 
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through language and education reforms that it was ultimately 
developed.66 
Although there was the main goal and unifying factor of 
freedom from Ottoman rule, it was the obvious diversity in Greek 
identity that made the War of Independence and creation of the 
state a very disruptive and tumultuous period, characterized by 
spurts of “anarchy” and “fratricidal conflicts.”67 Even 
retrospectively, many Greeks found the regional variations of 
identity and language too overwhelming to create true national 
cohesion, and some also found ways to poke fun at this aspect of 
the Greek world. Less than a decade after the end of the revolution, 
Dimitrios Vyzantios satirized the extreme diversity of the Greeks 
in his comedy Babel. In this comedy, which was set in the time 
frame immediately after the Battle of Navarino, Vyzantios 
described different scenarios of near chaos caused by the meeting 
of all these different Greeks, and likened it to the biblical story of 
Babel.68 Ever since the formation of the state, Greece’s legacy has 
been tarnished by political strife, upheaval, and constant 
reorganization.  While historians on the topic readily acknowledge 
the turmoil that plagued the revolution, they have traditionally 
attributed this post-revolutionary factionalism to foreign 
involvement. Although this outside involvement did antagonize the 
factions within Greece, it merely helped to magnify an already 
existing problem. 
During the Tourkokratia, Greek populations were spread 
throughout the expansive Ottoman Empire, creating different 
Greek socioeconomic groups and strengthening the differences in 
regional identities. Greek regional commitments played a strong 
role in obstructing a national identity, and it was the regionalism 
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present within the Greek world, coupled with the competing goals 
of the groups involved, which hindered the success of the Greek 
Revolution. Yes, the Greeks were successful in gaining their 
independence from Ottoman rule, but they were unable to establish 
a cohesive Greek national identity that was needed to foster 
unification under a centralized government, and a create state that 
was not characterized and plagued by internal discord. The defeat 
of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Greek state were 
ultimately executed by the Great Powers, but this was not the 
definitive reason for the subsequent political turmoil; it only acted 
to compound the factors of disunity that were already present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
